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A Personal Journey
Through the Rule of Law
in the South Pacific
BY W K HASTINGS

C

onceptually, the idea that the
rule of law is maintained by
an independent and impartial
judiciary is not difficult to understand.
In fact, we really only hear about “the
rule of law” in the popular media
when it is blatantly ignored by other
branches of government. And when
that happens, those branches usually
leave themselves open to a back-to-basics serve from the judiciary.
Such a serve was given by the Samoa
Court of Appeal recently in Attorney
General v Latu.1 It is a detailed judgment, but para [110] reveals its succinct
and beating heart:
[110] We see it as beyond reproach
that the Supreme Court can order the
Head of State to convene Parliament if
that is what the Constitution requires.
Latu was but one marker in a ruleof-law saga that played out in Samoa
in recent months. At issue was a very
close election, maneuvering on all
sides to either delay or bring on the
swearing-in of the contested elec-

tion’s winners, and the Supreme
Court’s authority to order the executive branch to perform its duty under
the constitution.
Some background is warranted:
Samoa’s general election on 5 April
2021 resulted in a tie between the ruling
Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP)
and the Faʻatuatua i le Atua Samoa
ua Tasi (FAST) party. An independent
member of Parliament decided to support the FAST party and break the tie.
After much legal jostling, Samoa’s
Head
of
State
Tuimalealiifano
Va’aletoa Sualauvi II issued a proclamation on 20 May 2021 to convene
the 27th Parliament on 24 May 2021 —
the last day the Legislative Assembly
could convene in accordance with the
Constitution, and a Supreme Court
order, to swear in the newly elected
leaders. However, the Head of State
then suspended that proclamation on
22 May 2021 until further notice.
FAST party leaders sought and
obtained a ruling from the Supreme
Court that the suspension was unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the caretaker

Speaker, a member of the HRPP, proclaimed the swearing-in scheduled for
24 May 2021 was “postponed,” and the
doors of Parliament were locked.
On 24 May 2021, a large tent was
set up beside the Parliament House,
and FAST’s members of Parliament
gathered to swear in the new leaders, including Fiamē Naomi Mataʻafa,
Samoa’s first woman prime minister.
The next day, the caretaker Attorney
General applied to the Supreme Court
for a declaration that the 24 May 2021
convening of Parliament was unlawful and unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court made that declaration but
also confirmed the validity of the 20
May 2021 proclamation and ordered
Parliament to be convened within
seven days. It was not. On 4 July 2021,
the Head of State proclaimed:
… the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to order the convening
of Parliament as only I, the HEAD
OF STATE of the Independent
State of Samoa, have the POWERS
to appoint a time and place for
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the meeting of the Legislative
Assembly.2
The Court of Appeal confirmed the
validity of the 20 May 2021 proclamation. It also held that the Supreme
Court’s ruling on the unconstitutionality of the swearing-in was based on an
assumption that the holders of office
would act in good faith — an assumption
that, in retrospect, was unwarranted,
given the 4 July 2021 proclamation. As
a result, the Court of Appeal declared
that the tent swearing-in was valid,
and that in the exercise of its “duty to
protect the Constitution and uphold
the rule of law,” the Supreme Court
had jurisdiction to order the convening of the Legislative Assembly when
the Head of State failed or refused to
do so.3
Defining the rule of law
Practically, an independent and impartial judiciary’s work to maintain the
rule of law is often undermined by less
noticeable micro-attacks, which rarely
make the headlines. If these are called
out, the reaction is generally that comfortable judges are complaining about
their conditions. Such attacks do not
appear so threatening in the moment.
But their cumulative effect is to soften
the ground for a headline-grabbing attack on the rule of law and the
judiciary of the dramatic type that happened in Samoa.
This article will describe some of the
micro-attacks (and perhaps some not
so “micro”) that I have encountered on
my way to becoming the Chief Justice
of Kiribati. Before that though, it may
be useful to unpack what I mean when
I talk about maintaining the rule of law.
I have found no better definition of
the rule of law than that provided by
the World Justice Project:

The rule of law
must prevail over
external and
internal stressors.
The greater the
stress, the more
important the rule
of law becomes.
The rule of law is a durable system of laws, institutions, norms,
and community commitment that
delivers accountability, just law,
open government, and accessible
and impartial justice.4
This definition works for a number
of reasons.
First, it emphasizes durability. The
rule of law must prevail over external
and internal stressors. The greater the
stress, the more important the rule of
law becomes.
Second, it emphasizes system. The
rule of law is not an abstract concept. It
is an assembly of parts that work well
together. The more practice the parts
have working together without stress,
the more resilient the rule of law
becomes under stress. In a democracy,
the rule of law requires each of the
three branches of government to exercise reciprocal restraint in the exercise
of their powers.
The rule of law must prevail over
external and internal stressors. The
greater the stress, the more important
the rule of law becomes.
Third, it emphasizes that the rule of
law includes things other than laws,
such as norms and community commitment. The rule of law is felt in
the community where people want

to see its benefits. The community
wants to see disputes resolved quickly,
offenders punished justly, commerce
encouraged with clear and fair rules,
and a government that is open and
accountable to the people. The community will commit to the rule of law to
achieve these benefits. The reference
to norms includes a shared belief that
any system requires its actors to work
together in good faith.5 By including
“norms and community commitment”
as a component of the system, this
definition also recognizes variations on
the central theme that are determined
by things such as culture, economics,
and geography.
Fourth, community commitment on
the international stage requires each
branch of government in one country
where the rule of law is maintained by
an independent and impartial judiciary
to recognize the significance of the
concept in other countries. Failure to
do so indicates a lack of appreciation of
the importance of the concept not only
in the other country but also at home.
Fifth, accessible and impartial justice requires that justice is delivered in
a timely manner by competent, impartial, and independent adjudicators.
The adjudicators must have adequate
resources, not just to do their job
but to do it to a high standard. The
adjudicators should also reflect the
communities they serve; the more an
adjudicator looks like they belong to
the community and shares the community’s values, the more likely the
community is to trust and have confidence in the system of justice. The rule
of law benefits from that confidence in
the judiciary.
Finally, the definition emphasizes
that the rule of law is not an end in
itself. It is the means to achieve the four
deliverables of accountability, just law,
open government and accessible and
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impartial justice. Every
community wants these
things because they just
make life better.

the expiration of the
period of his appointment to that office.”
Both sections worked
together. Although neiThe first threat
ther specified the length
Security of tenure
of tenure or a mandaI
witnessed
several
tory retirement age,
threats to the indepenthere was nothing in
dence of the judiciary and,
them that appeared to
by extension, to the rule
affect a judge’s security
of law during my journey
of tenure during his or
to becoming the Chief
her appointment, and
Justice of Kiribati. I will
the Constitution set out
focus on three of them.
a detailed, and difficult,
JUSTICE W K HASTINGS HOLDS COURT IN KIRIBATI. (PHOTO COURTESY OF JUSTICE HASTINGS)
I was appointed Chief
removal process.
Justice of Kiribati on 5
The amendment bill
July 2021, but because the pandemic are made according to clearly defined changed all that. It sought to amend
complicated travel plans, I was not criteria and by a publicly declared pro- section 5 so that “(t)he appointment of
sworn in until 9 August 2021. Kiribati cess.6 The criteria for this position set a judge must be made on a fixed term
had been without a Chief Justice for out what is essentially the job descrip- specified in a written contract, which
seven months. The previous Chief tion for any Chief Justice: leading the may be extended where deemed necJustice left at the end of his term in judiciary; serving as “liaison” between essary. This applies to new and existing
December 2020. A Puisne Judge of the the judiciary and other branches of the judges.”
High Court was overseas and unable government; maintaining the indepenThe amendment bill raised two
to return, as was the Chief Magistrate. dence of and public confidence in the issues. The first is that it purported to
Although a Commissioner of the High judiciary; overseeing the delivery of put judges on contract. It did not say
Court was doing what he could to legal training to all judicial officers; and with whom, but the most likely other
hold hearings, by the time I arrived, presiding over cases effectively and party would be the President as Head
the backlog of unresolved cases had impartially.
of State. Nothing in the Constitution
grown to 1,200. Without leadership
While the recruitment agency and and nothing in the 2017 Act requires
of the judicial branch, without judges Kiribati were determining whether I a judge to be on contract; they only
(let alone independent and impartial passed muster, seemingly out of the refer to appointments. Although it
ones), and without an efficient process blue (or at least without notice to me), had been the practice in Kiribati for
for case resolution, it is fair to say that a bill was introduced to the Maneaba ni judges to sign contracts setting out
the rule of law in Kiribati was already Maungatabu, the Kiribati Parliament: the conditions of their appointment,
under threat.
An Act to Amend the High Court that practice could not be said to be the
I heard about the job from my head Judges (Salaries and Allowances) Act best practice unless a judge’s security
of bench, who solicited expressions of 2017. This was the first of the three of tenure during the appointment was
interest within our court at the end of threats to the rule of law I encountered protected. As the amendment bill did
2020. I expressed an interest. This was on this journey. The original 2017 Act not proscribe the content of any conno shoulder-tapping exercise. Kiribati provided in section 5 that “Pursuant to tract, the potential for interference
decided to use an Australian legal section 83(1) of the Constitution, the with a judge’s security of tenure was
recruitment firm to run the appoint- tenure of office for judges of the High evident. The potential alone is suffiment process, which put the process at Court shall be subject to the appoint- cient to find interference with judicial
arm’s length from the executive branch. ment.” Section 83(1) of the Constitution independence.
One of the hallmarks of an indepen- states that “the office of a judge of the
It also conflated appointment to
dent judiciary is that appointments High Court shall become vacant upon public office with contract. A judge’s
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independence is compromised by a contractual employment relationship. The
position of a judge is better described
as a public office rather than as a private law contractual relationship.
Furthermore,
the
bill
purported to apply to existing judges.
Retrospectively putting a judge on
contract is abhorrent to judicial independence. It is also unworkable. If
a judge refused to sign such a contract relying on the fact of his or her
appointment as the authority to sit, the
potential for conflict with the executive — which would be relying on a
statute passed procedurally correctly
by the legislative branch — is significant. The bill challenged the ability of
all three branches of government to
work together to uphold the rule of
law.
On 16 April 2021, the Commonwealth
Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association
(CMJA), the Commonwealth Legal
Education Association (CLEA), and the
Commonwealth Lawyers Association
(CLA) issued a joint statement about
the bill. Framing their statement
in terms of “democratic principles
including respect for the authority
of an independent and impartial judiciary,” they stated: “[W]e are concerned
that the principles of security of tenure will be adversely affected by the
provisions that all high court judges
will be appointed on a contract basis.”7
The statement was silent on the retrospectivity clause.
Kiribati received advice from a number of other quarters that the bill was
unconstitutional. At second reading,
the contract clause was removed and
replaced with a clause stating that
judges are appointed for a fixed term.
(Many countries do this, including New
Zealand, which gives judges who have
reached mandatory retirement age
acting warrants to continue sitting,

usually for two years.) And with these
changes, the bill came into force.
The bill was better, but not ideal. I
had to make a choice. If I withdrew
from becoming Chief Justice, Kiribati
would have to restart its process of
finding a suitable appointee. I reasoned
that accepting the role would enable
me to influence decision-makers in
Kiribati and provide the opportunity
to constantly reinforce the importance
of the rule of law and an independent
judiciary. Being on the ground would
give me the ability to implement a
few ideas, including triaging and dealing with the backlog of cases with the
resources at hand; encouraging the
appointment of more judges, including
qualified
i-Kiribati from the ranks
of the profession and 120 magistrates; encouraging the design of robes
that look like they belong to 21st-century Kiribati instead of 18th-century
England; bringing into force new rules
of civil procedure; and encouraging
investment in training, buildings, and
systems. All of this would enhance
Kiribati’s commitment to the rule of
law in a highly visible manner.
Not being on the ground would
change nothing, and Kiribati had
already addressed the Commonwealth
agencies’ only stated objection by
removing the contract clause. I decided
to accept the appointment with the
support of the New Zealand heads of
bench. Still, it would be another three
months before I set foot in Kiribati.
Two more threats

An executive with too much authority
and too little responsibility

During these three months, we had
many logistical issues to address,
each made worse by the pandemic.
There were no commercial flights into
Kiribati, which meant either chartering
a plane or hitching a ride on a cargo or

military plane — and at whose expense?
There were uninsurable risks, including evacuation necessitated by a
COVID-19 outbreak. Each week was
complicated by fresh events — an outbreak in Fiji stopped the usual route
to Kiribati; an outbreak in Brisbane
stopped the secondary route to Kiribati.
Ensuring I would not have to live out of
a suitcase for the next three years put
strain on the logistics of airfreight and
seafreight into Kiribati. Each of these
logistical issues was either overcome
or the risk assumed.
Then
the
“Memorandum
of
Understanding” hove into view during
the week before I was finally scheduled
to travel. As I was not resigning my
New Zealand warrants, the memorandum was presented in apparently final
form to the New Zealand Chief District
Court Judge for his perusal. It contained two clauses of concern (these
are the second and third of the threats
to judicial independence I referred to
earlier):
Y acknowledges and accepts that
the day to day work direction of
Judge Hastings will be set by the
Government . . . .
For the avoidance of doubt, Y
will not fund or organize the repatriation of Judge Hastings should
a COVID-19 outbreak occur in
Kiribati (emphasis added).
I have deliberately not stated
the parties to the Memorandum of
Understanding, or which country is
“Y.” Both clauses, however, certainly
affected the independence of the
judiciary.
A judge cannot be said to be independent if his or her “day-to-day work
direction” is set by a government, that
is, the executive branch. The concept
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is rather breathtaking in its disregard
of judicial independence. Perhaps the
clause was meant to serve another
purpose, but on its face, the idea that
judges should be directed by the government fundamentally undermines
the rule of law. The clause was objectionable for the same reason the
Commonwealth agencies gave when
they criticized the contract clause in
the amendment bill — it gave the executive branch too much authority over
an independent judiciary.
A judge cannot be said to be independent if his or her “day-to-day work
direction” is set by a government, that
is, the executive branch. The concept is
rather breathtaking in its disregard of
judicial independence.
The second clause regarding assistance in the event of a COVID-19
outbreak was problematic for nearly
opposite reasons — it allowed the government to shirk responsibility. A
country can hardly be said to be committed to the rule of law if it does not
provide at least the same support to
judges as it does to members of the
other two branches in an emergency.
Of course, one could understand
that a developing country such as
Kiribati would find it difficult to allocate any more resources to a judge
than to members of the other two
branches in such an emergency. And
the clause made no reference to how
members of other branches of government were to be treated. So, while
not ideal, and provided that members
of the other branches were treated the
same way, the second clause was arguably unlikely to violate the minimum
standard found in the Latimer House
Principles, which require a legal framework that is sufficient to ensure that
governments do not single out judges
for disproportionate adverse treatment.8 But not knowing if members

A judge cannot
be said to be
independent
if his or her
“day-to-day work
direction” is set by
a government, that
is, the executive
branch. The
concept is rather
breathtaking in its
disregard of judicial
independence.
of the other branches would be left
to fend for themselves in the event of
an emergency (something I doubted), I
was dismayed.
The problem is not always where
you think
Now might be a good time for a revelation: The parties to the Memorandum
of Understanding are New Zealand
government agencies, and the country of “Y” is New Zealand, not Kiribati.
Both clauses were drafted by New
Zealand officials. Thankfully, as soon as
members of the New Zealand judiciary
saw those clauses, the significance of
their impact on the rule of law was
quickly explained. The first clause
was removed entirely, and the second
clause was modified to read:
In the event of any emergency situation arising for Judge
Hastings, such as under a COVID19 outbreak in Kiribati, where
evacuation and repatriation is
not immediately and reasonably

available to Judge Hastings under
an insurance policy, the Parties
will act in good faith to implement potential solutions that
are reasonably practicable in the
circumstances and respond effectively to the emergency situation.
Better than “will not,” I thought.
As was the case with the amendment bill, the remediation of both
clauses represented a measure of success against what could be considered
micro-attacks on an independent and
impartial judiciary’s ability to maintain the rule of law. That these attacks
came from such an unexpected source
perhaps underscores three things:
The first is the need for vigilance.
No country is immune from attacks
or proposed attacks on the independence of the judiciary. Judges need
to call them out in their own country
even if the public might see the judges
as complaining yet again about their
comfortable conditions. Actors on the
international stage need to call these
aggressions out when they occur in
other countries that share a commitment to an independent judiciary as a
means of maintaining the rule of law.
Failure to call them out indicates a
lack of awareness of, or commitment
to, the rule of law in one’s own country. We cannot claim any moral high
ground internationally if we allow our
own commitment to the rule of law to
be undermined at home.
We cannot claim any moral high
ground internationally if we allow our
own commitment to the rule of law to
be undermined at home.
The second is the need for good faith.
The idea of good faith was inserted
into the emergency clause and was also
stated to be a significant constitutional
principle in AG v Latu.9 To paraphrase
the Samoa Court of Appeal, the rule of
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law relies on the good faith of the relevant state actors, all of whom owe
obligations to the Constitution. An
independent and impartial judiciary is
an important part of the machinery by
which these obligations are fulfilled.
Public confidence in each branch of
government also requires each branch
to act in good faith with respect to the
others and with respect to the people
they serve.
The third is perhaps more prosaic,
but the occasional refresher course
in fundamental constitutional principles wouldn’t go amiss. The challenge
is to ensure the day-to-day application of those principles. We as judges
must always be aware of and pay constant attention to the basic principles
that underlie the separation of powers.
And, when necessary, we must remind
our colleagues in the other branches of
these principles.
I arrived in Kirabati, fully vaccinated, on 27 July 2021 via a Royal New
Zealand Air Force flight. I was greeted
from 50 metres away by a person clad
head-to-toe in PPE (personal protec-

We cannot
claim any moral
high ground
internationally if
we allow our own
commitment to the
rule of law to be
undermined
at home.
tive equipment). They gestured to me
to carry my suitcase and a box of medicines I now seemed to be in charge of
into an ambulance, which took me to 14
days’ quarantine in a repurposed hotel.
After five negative Covid tests, I was
released on the day I was to be sworn
in. I was welcomed by a special sitting
of the High Court, where I committed to protect the independence of the
judiciary and the rule of law. And now
I am engaged in the day-to-day appli-

cation of those fundamental principles
on the ground in Kiribati.
There are legal and constitutional
challenges almost every day. There
are also personal challenges. The picture is of me sitting in Onotoa, one of
the outer islands to which I’ve been on
circuit. No Chief Justice had visited for
six years. I was melting. The temperature here is always between 30 and 35
degrees Celsius. I’ve been to a second
island, Beru, where I held court and
drank algae to appease the local spirit.
Soon I’m off to Christmas Island, 3,000
kilometres to the east, where one of
my cases is a part-heard judge-alone
murder trial.
I hope to report some success in
maintaining the principles I was sworn
to uphold, but that is for a future
edition.

W K HASTINGS is a Judge of the District Court
and Court Martial of New Zealand, currently on
secondment from both as the Chief Justice of Kiribati
and President of its Court of Appeal.
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